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Although Congress and the majority of state
legislatures have resisted enacting draconian gun
control laws, the courts are the final bulwark in
safeguarding our constitutional right to keep
and bear arms. Yet the courts of late have been
the scene of unprecedented attacks on that right
as gun control advocates have used the judiciary
to make an end-run around the legislative
process. Meritless litigation brought by govern-
ment plaintiffs in multiple jurisdictions are just
part of a scheme to force gun makers to adopt
policies that legislatures have wisely rejected.
Moreover, the suits are used by politicians to
reward their allies—private attorneys, many of
whom are major campaign contributors—with
lucrative contingency fee contracts.
Meanwhile, many of the same politicians have
exploited a few recent tragedies to promote their
anti-gun agenda. But gun controls haven’t
worked and more controls won’t help. In fact,
many of the recommended regulations will make
matters worse by stripping law-abiding citizens
of their most effective means of self-defense.
Violence in America is due not to the availability
of guns but to social pathologies—illegitimacy,
dysfunctional schools, and drug and alcohol
abuse. Historically, more gun laws have gone
hand in hand with an explosion of violent crime.
Only during the past decade—with vigorous law
enforcement, a booming economy, and an older
population—have we seen dramatic reductions
in violence, coupled with a record number of
guns in circulation.
Before we compromise constitutional rights
expressly recognized in the Second Amendment,
we ought to be sure of three things: first, that
we’ve identified the real problem; second, that
we’ve pinpointed its cause; and, third, that our
remedy is no more extensive than necessary to fix
the problem. The spreading litigation against
gun makers fails all three tests as do the latest
gun control proposals. Guns do not increase vio-
lence; they reduce violence. Banning or regulat-
ing firearms will not eliminate the underlying
pathologies. And a less invasive remedy already
exists: enforce existing laws.
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Introduction
Gun makers, engulfed by a torrent of liti-
gation from dozens of cities, were threatened
by the Clinton administration during the
summer of 1999 with additional claims,
from more than three thousand public hous-
ing authorities, coordinated by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban
Development.1 Under President Bush, fur-
ther action by HUD will almost certainly be
shelved. Still, ongoing city- and state-spon-
sored lawsuits could destroy the firearms
industry, with profound implications for the
rule of law and the Constitution. The gov-
ernment’s resort to litigation as a tactic of
intimidation and extortion will have destruc-
tive consequences extending far beyond a sin-
gle industry.
Here’s how the current avalanche of law-
suits against gun makers unfolded. In June
1997 the giant tobacco companies first caved
in to the state Medicaid recovery suits.
Cigarette manufacturers, besieged by claims
in dozens of states and sued under perverted
rules of tort law that eliminated any oppor-
tunity to defend themselves,2 decided to set-
tle—that is, to bribe the politicians instead of
going to war against a punitive money grab.
That capitulation—the surrender of the
industry’s right to market a perfectly legal
product—predictably spawned a new round
of litigation. This time, gun makers were pit-
ted against the combined resources of bil-
lionaire trial lawyers, city mayors, county
executives, a state attorney general, and the
Clinton administration.
In bullying gun makers, the plaintiffs
have included three corrosive ingredients,
carried over from the tobacco wars, in their
litigation formula: First, they have sued in
multiple jurisdictions, thereby escalating the
industry’s legal costs. Second, they have
employed contingency fee lawyers, many of
whom are major political donors. Third, they
have tried to use the judicial branch to bypass
the legislature.
To begin, I will examine that new litiga-
tion paradigm. Then I’ll digress briefly to
explore Second Amendment concerns. Next,
I will analyze the suits threatened by public
housing authorities, the claims by some cities
that gun makers are responsible for “negli-
gent marketing,” the allegation by other
cities that guns are an “unreasonably danger-
ous” and “defective” product, and the fallout
from the Smith & Wesson settlement. That
will be followed by an assessment of the data
that allegedly link gun injuries to gun owner-
ship and, finally, a look at the various pro-
posals that purport to remedy gun violence.
Government-Sponsored
Tort Suits: The New
Paradigm
When public officials prosecute lawbreak-
ers, those officials are fulfilling a legitimate
role of government. Most of the time, that
prosecutorial role is unobjectionable, and it
is often commendable. But the latest rounds
of litigation—tobacco, then guns—are differ-
ent in three respects, each of which threatens
the rule of law.
First, coordinated actions by multiple
government entities can impose enormous
legal fees on defendants. Such actions have
been used to extort money notwithstanding
the fact that the underlying case is without
merit. Just listen to former Philadelphia
mayor Edward G. Rendell, a Democrat, call-
ing for dozens of cities to file concurrent
suits against gun makers: They “don’t have
the deep pockets of the tobacco industry,”
Rendell explained, and multiple lawsuits
“could bring them to the negotiating table a
lot sooner.”3 Never mind that the suits are
baseless. We’re dealing not with law but with
extortion parading as law.
One effective way to stop such thievery is
to implement a “government pays” rule for
legal fees when a governmental unit is the
losing plaintiff in a civil case. In the criminal
sphere, defendants are already entitled to
court-appointed counsel if needed; they’re
also protected by the requirement for proof
2
We’re dealing not
with law but with
extortion parad-
ing as law.
beyond reasonable doubt and by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.
No corresponding safeguards against abu-
sive public-sector litigation exist in civil cases.
By limiting the rule to cases involving gov-
ernment plaintiffs, access to the courts is pre-
served for less-affluent, private plaintiffs
seeking redress of legitimate grievances. But
defendants in government suits will be able
to resist meritless cases that are brought by
the state solely to ratchet up the pressure for
a large financial settlement.
“Government pays” becomes ever more
urgent with the recent emergence of an insidi-
ous relationship between the plaintiffs’ bar and
some government officials. That relationship—
common to tobacco and gun litigation—is a
second major threat to the rule of law.
Both rounds of litigation were concocted
by a handful of private attorneys who entered
into contingency fee contracts with the gov-
ernment. In effect, members of the private bar
were hired as government subcontractors, but
with a huge financial share in the outcome.
That’s not a problem, says Rendell. He
announced that cities were suing gun makers
only for improved safety features and changes
in distribution practices, not monetary dam-
ages. Yet one day after Rendell’s disclaimer,
Miami and Bridgeport filed their suits, seek-
ing hundreds of millions of dollars in dam-
ages.4 New Orleans asked for damages5 and so
did Chicago (in fact, $433 million).6 The
claims include not only medical costs associat-
ed with gun violence but also the costs of
police protection, emergency services, police
overtime and pensions, courts, prisons, loss of
population, cleaning the streets of blood,
lower property values, even lost tax revenue
from reduced worker productivity7—plus
punitive damages. And nearly all of the cities
have solicited private lawyers to work for a
contingency fee based on those damages.
So if money isn’t the primary goal, there
will be a lot of attorneys working for free.
Maybe that’s what they deserve. After all, the
gun suits aren’t intended to go to trial. In
fact, HUD’s threat, on top of the city and
county claims, was meant to promote a set-
tlement, not a trial. No doubt, with a pid-
dling $1.5 billion in annual revenues, gun
makers are not going to yield the same trea-
sure trove as the tobacco behemoths whose
worldwide sales are $300 billion. But that’s
not fatal, because the real goal of the trial
lawyers is to chalk up one more victory, thus
demonstrating to future wealthy defendants
that groundless legal theories are good
enough when the coercive power of multiple
government entities is arrayed against an
unpopular industry.
When a private lawyer subcontracts his ser-
vices to the government, he bears the same
responsibility as a government lawyer. He is a
public servant beholden to all citizens, includ-
ing the defendant, and his overriding objective
is to seek justice. Imagine a state attorney paid
a contingency fee for each indictment that he
secures, or state troopers paid per speeding
ticket. The potential for corruption is enor-
mous. Still, the states in their tobacco suits
doled out multibillion dollar contracts to pri-
vate counsel—not pursuant to per hour fee
agreements, which might occasionally be jus-
tified to acquire unique outside competence
or experience, but as contingency fees, a sure-
fire catalyst for abuse of power. And those con-
tracts were awarded without competitive bid-
ding to lawyers who often bankrolled state
political campaigns.8
Government is the single entity autho-
rized, in narrowly defined circumstances, to
wield coercive power against private citizens.
When government functions as prosecutor
or plaintiff in a legal proceeding in which it
also dispenses punishment, adequate safe-
guards against state misbehavior are essen-
tial. That is why in civil litigation we rely pri-
marily on private remedies with redress
sought by, and for the benefit of, the injured
party and not the state. As the Supreme
Court cautioned more than 60 years ago, an
attorney for the state “is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all.”9










between government and a private attorney
should be illegal. We cannot in a free society con-
done private lawyers enforcing public law with
an incentive kicker to increase the penalties.
Third, and perhaps most important, laws
are supposed to be enacted by legislatures,
not by the executive or judicial branches. In
too many instances, government-sponsored
litigation has been a substitute for failed leg-
islation. That violates the principle of separa-
tion of powers—a centerpiece of the federal
Constitution and no less important at the
state level. Evidently, none of that matters to
many of the attorneys general, mayors, and
their allies in the private bar. In an attempt to
circumvent the legislative process, they
intend to pursue through litigation what was
rejected by the legislature.
It’s interesting to contrast the legal per-
spective on product prohibition that prevailed
in 1919 with the view that now prevails—eight
decades later. In 1919 we understood that
Congress did not have the power to prohibit
the sale of alcohol, so prohibition was accom-
plished by a constitutional amendment (the
Eighteenth). Today the drug war is entirely
statutory with little thought of its constitu-
tional implications. When it comes to tobacco,
the Clinton administration argued that not
only didn’t we need a constitutional amend-
ment, we also didn’t need a statute – just a del-
egation of some sort to an unelected and
unaccountable administrative agency (the
Food and Drug Administration) with author-
ity to ban nicotine.1 0And in the case of guns,
it seems we don’t need a constitutional
amendment, or a statute, or a delegation, just
multiple lawsuits by means of which the exec-
utive branch uses the judicial branch to bypass
the legislature and effect a variety of gun pro-
hibitions. So much for limited government
and separation of powers. We’re left with the
executive state. Return of the king. That’s the
regime under which dozens of cities, aided by
the Clinton administration, took the gun bat-
tle to the courts—suing gun makers for “negli-
gently marketing” a “defective product.”
But before discussing those lawsuits, a
quick but important detour.
To Keep and Bear Arms
At the same time cities are suing the gun
industry, a Texas appeals court is reviewing a
lower court decision that invalidated a feder-
al statute on Second Amendment grounds.
Thus, the Supreme Court, for the first time
in more than 60 years, may soon revisit the
right to keep and bear arms. Does the Second
Amendment secure that right? If so, what
restrictions can governments place on its
exercise? The answers to those questions
could determine the outcome of litigation,
and legislation as well, directed at stricter
gun control. So let’s look briefly at the under-
lying constitutional issue.
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” That’s the text of the Second
Amendment; and here’s the question that
seems to have perplexed the Supreme Court
for more than 200 years: Does the right to
keep and bear arms, as laid out in the Second
Amendment, belong to each of us as an indi-
vidual, or does it belong to us collectively as
members of the militia? Here’s the answer:
The Second Amendment, like the First and
Fourth Amendments, refers explicitly to “the
right of the people.” No reasonable person can
doubt that First Amendment rights—speech,
religion, assembly, and redress of grievances—
belong to us as individuals. Similarly, Fourth
Amendment protections against unreason-
able searches and seizures are individual
rights. We secure “the right of the people” by
guaranteeing the right of each person.
Likewise, the Second Amendment protects,
not the state, but each individual against the
state—that is, the amendment is a deterrent to
government tyranny.11
Some people would insist that, although
the threat of tyrannical government has not
disappeared, it is less today than it was when
our Republic was experiencing its birth
pangs. Perhaps so. Tyranny may well be a
lesser threat now, but incompetence by the
state in defending its citizens against crimi-
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tion has been a
substitute for
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nals is a greater threat. The demand for
police to defend us increases in proportion to
our inability to defend ourselves. That’s why
disarmed societies tend to become police
states. Witness law-abiding inner-city resi-
dents, many of whom have been disarmed by
gun control, begging for police protection
against drug gangs despite the terrible viola-
tions of civil liberties such protection
entails—such as curfews, anti-loitering laws,
civil asset forfeiture, even nonconsensual
searches of public housing.
So even if a reduced threat of government
tyranny no longer requires an armed citizenry,
an unarmed citizenry could well create the con-
ditions that lead to tyranny. The right to bear
arms is thus prophylactic—it reduces the
demand for a police state—rather than remedi-
al. George Washington University law professor
Robert Cottrol puts it this way: “A people inca-
pable of protecting themselves will lose their
rights as a free people, becoming either servile
dependents of the state or of the criminal
predators who are their de facto masters.”12
More than 60 years ago, in 1939, the
Supreme Court looked at the question of
individual right or collective right in United
States v. Miller.13 The statute in Miller was the
1934 National Firearms Act, which required
registration of machine guns, sawed-off
rifles, sawed-off shotguns, and silencers.
First, said the Court, “militia” is a term of art
that means “the body of the people capable
of bearing arms.”1 4 That suggested a right
belonging to all of us, as individuals. But the
Court also held that the right to bear arms
extended only to weapons rationally related
to the militia—not a sawed-off shotgun,
which was at issue in Miller.
That mixed ruling has puzzled legal schol-
ars for six decades. If military use is the deci-
sive test, then one would think today’s citi-
zens can possess rocket launchers, missiles,
even nuclear arms. Obviously, that’s not what
the Court had in mind. Because the Court’s
opinion in Miller is so murky, argues George
Mason University law professor Nelson
Lund, maybe the only lesson we can draw is
that the case must be interpreted narrowly,
allowing restrictions on those types of
weapons covered by the 1934 Act—weapons
like machine guns and silencers, which have
slight value to law-abiding citizens and high
value to criminals.1 5
Apparently, that’s the position that a few
renowned, liberal law professors are now tak-
ing. It started with a famous 1989 article,
“The Embarrassing Second Amendment,” by
professor Sanford Levinson in the Yale Law
Journal.1 6 For the first time, a prominent lib-
eral acknowledged that the Second
Amendment should be treated as something
more than an inkblot. Evidently, the liberal
apostasy has caught on. Harvard professor
Laurence Tribe and Yale professor Akhil
Amar concede that there’s an individual right
to keep and bear arms, albeit limited as in
Miller by “reasonable regulation in the inter-
est of public safety.”1 7
In effect, they argue that the Second
Amendment, like the First Amendment, is
not absolute. “Reasonable” restrictions—for
example, on the types of weapons that can be
purchased—may be justified on cost/benefit
grounds. On the other hand, Tribe and Amar
imply that the Fourteenth Amendment
binds the states, not just the federal govern-
ment, to honor the Second Amendment. In
that respect, the two professors go further
than our federal appellate courts, which have
taken a states’ rights approach to the Second
Amendment—rubber-stamping state gun
prohibitions without subjecting them to rig-
orous constitutional scrutiny.
That difference between federal and state
treatment is important in answering one of
the arguments frequently made against the
Second Amendment by anti-gun advocates.
For example, the Center to Prevent Handgun
Violence makes this argument: When our
nation was founded, many states had com-
munal storage of guns and restricted their
use to white males only. Maryland actually
seized guns that weren’t used in the militia;
Pennsylvania denied firearms to 40 percent
of its citizens for lack of virtue. Therefore, the
Framers could not have intended an individ-












the missing link: Until 1868 when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Bill
of Rights constrained only the federal gov-
ernment. What the states did prior to that
time is not directly relevant from a constitu-
tional perspective. 
With that brief background, let’s turn next
to an important new case in Lubbock, Texas.
United States v. Emerson18 could be the first
Second Amendment case to reach the
Supreme Court in more than six decades. In
Texas, like many other states, spouses involved
in divorce proceedings are routinely put under
a court order restraining them from harassing,
stalking, or threatening their partner—even
without a showing that malevolent intent
exists. A federal statute makes it illegal for any-
one under that type of restraining order to
possess a gun. Emerson was indicted under
the federal statute, although there was no
proof that he planned a violent act against his
wife. He contested his indictment on Second
Amendment grounds. In April 1999 a federal
judge dismissed the indictment, agreeing with
Emerson that the statute violated the Second
Amendment. The government appealed, the
case has been argued, and a decision is now
awaited from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.
The trial judge, Samuel Cummings, didn’t
equivocate. He said: “If the amendment truly
meant what the collective rights advocates
propose, then the text would read, ‘A well reg-
ulated Militia being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the states [or the
militia] to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed.’”1 9 Cummings might have added
that a collective right, if conferred on the
states, would permit “state governments [to]
maintain military organizations indepen-
dent from the federal military, and to arm
those organizations with nuclear weapons or
whatever else the state may choose.”20 A
states’ rights approach would also suggest
that “Supreme Court decisions recognizing
that the federal government has final author-
ity over the deployment and use of the
National Guard must be incorrect.”2 1
When Cummings parsed the two clauses
of the Second Amendment, he concluded:
“The function of the subordinate clause was
not to qualify the right, but instead to show
why it must be protected. . . . If this right were
not protected, the existence of the militia,
and consequently the security of the state,
would be jeopardized.”2 2In other words, the
second clause (“the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”)
is operational; it secures the right. The first
clause (“A well regulated Militia, being neces-
sary to the security of a free State”) is
explanatory; it justifies the right. That syntax
was not unusual for the times. For example,
the free press clause of the 1842 Rhode Island
Constitution states, “The liberty of the press
being essential to the security of freedom in a
state, any person may publish his sentiments
of any subject.”2 3That provision surely does-
n’t mean that the right to publish protects
only the press. It protects “any person,” and
one reason among others that it protects any
person is that a free press is essential to a free
society.
In a similar vein, Article I, section 8, of the
U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power
to grant copyrights to “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.” Yet copyrights
are granted to Hustler magazine, to racist
publications, even to literature that expressly
seeks to retard science and the useful arts.24
The proper understanding of the copyright
provision is that promoting science and the
arts is one justification—but not the only jus-
tification—for the copyright power. Analog-
ously, the militia clause helps explain why we
have a right to bear arms, but it’s not neces-
sary to the exercise of that right.
As you might guess, that was not the posi-
tion of the Clinton administration. Consider
this exchange at the oral argument before the
Fifth Circuit in Emerson:
Judge William L. Garwood: You
are saying that the Second Amend-
ment is consistent with a position
that you can take guns away from
the public? You restrict ownership of










people? Is that the position of the
United States?
Deputy U.S. Attorney General
William Meteja: Yes.
Garwood: Is it the position of the
United States that persons who are
not in the National Guard are
afforded no protections under the
Second Amendment?
Meteja: Exactly.2 5
Meteja later explained that even Guard
members are protected by the Second
Amendment only when and to the extent that
their weapons are used for Guard business.
For those who believe that the Constitution
means what it says, here’s another text-based
argument: The term “well-regulated,” in its 18th
century context, didn’t mean heavily regulated,
but rather properly, and not overly, regulated.
Looked at in that manner, the Second
Amendment ensures that the militia would not
be improperly regulated, even weakened—say by
disarming the citizens who would be its soldiers.26
Bear in mind that Article I, section 8, gives
Congress, not the states, the power to call
forth and “provide for organizing, arming . . .
disciplining . . . and for governing” the mili-
tia. State powers are limited to appointing
officers and training. The Framers feared and
distrusted standing armies; so they provided
for a federal militia—all able-bodied males
over the age of 17—as a counterweight
against potential tyranny. But the Framers
also realized, in granting Congress near-ple-
nary power over the militia, that a select,
armed militia subset—like today’s National
Guard—could be equivalent to a standing
army. So they wisely crafted the Second
Amendment to forbid Congress to disarm
other citizens, thereby certifying that the
militia would be “well-regulated.”2 7
Consider also these three changes made
by the 1789 Congress when it drafted the
amendment: First, a provision excusing con-
scientious objectors from military service was
eliminated—making it clear that the Second
Amendment is about firearms, not about
military service. Second, the term “well
armed” was stripped as a modifier of
“Militia”—again clarifying that the arms were
those of the people not those of the military.
Third, the phrase “for the common defense”
was dropped after the words “to keep and
bear Arms”—no ambiguity there; the intent
was to provide an individual right of defense,
not common defense.2 8
Finally, it’s worth noting that there are at
least three other constitutional arguments
against gun control, apart form the Second
Amendment: (1) Many gun regulations are
too vague and thus don’t provide citizens
with adequate notice of the particular acts
that are illegal. That offends the Due Process
Clause. (2) Some federal controls may
intrude on matters traditionally subject to
state supervision, or may exceed the powers
of Congress enumerated in Article I, section
8. That would violate the Tenth Amendment,
which instructs that the federal government
may exercise only those powers that are enu-
merated in the Constitution and delegated
by it to the United States. (3) An individual
right to keep and bear arms could well be
among the unenumerated rights secured by
the Ninth Amendment.
Litigation Tyranny
Now let’s switch gears—from constitu-
tional law to tort law—as we turn to the del-
uge of lawsuits against the gun industry:
first, the federal government claims, which
the Bush administration will probably not
pursue, then the litigation by more than 30
cities and counties as well as New York state.
Federal Claims
At the federal level, Clinton’s HUD secre-
tary, Andrew Cuomo, had a plan to change
the way the nation’s gun makers do business.
Already smothered by litigation from dozens
of cities and counties, the gun industry
would have been crushed under the weight of
legal action from a horde of 3,200 housing
authorities synchronized by HUD. The gov-














sible for defraying the cost of security guards
and for alarm systems installed to curb vio-
lence in public housing.29
Like the cities, HUD said it was not inter-
ested in money damages. Maybe so, but
Cuomo and his acolytes understood very well
that the small gun industry couldn’t afford to
defend itself, even against unfounded suits, in
the face of such overwhelming firepower. A
Wall Street Journal story emphasized that very
point: “As with the municipal suits, one filed
on behalf of housing authorities would be
groundbreaking and certainly not a sure bet to
succeed in court. But a suit by a large group of
housing authorities could [exhaust] gun com-
panies’ resources in pretrial maneuvering—by
making demands for documents concerning
industry distribution practices in hundreds or
thousands of localities.”3 0
In justifying HUD’s litigation plans,
Cuomo contended that “only one percent of
the dealers are selling over 50 percent of the
guns used in crimes.”3 1 But if crimes were
linked to guns sold by particular dealers, why
weren’t the underlying data turned over to
authorities whose duty it is to shut down
dealers who break laws against those sales—
laws that are on the books in all 50 states?
Instead, Cuomo sought to compel gun mak-
ers to become police, judge, and jury—to fer-
ret out “bad” dealers, some of whom were
entirely innocent, and deny to those dealers,
without due process of law, the merchandise
they sell for a living.
That was just the beginning. Cuomo also
demanded safer guns. “We have safety caps on
aspirin,” he says, so why not safety locks on
guns?3 2Well, let’s see, there are a couple of rel-
evant differences between guns and aspirin.
The requirement for safety caps on aspirin
arose out of legislation, not judicial mandate.
Aspirin is legally accessible to kids; guns aren’t.
Furthermore, not many people when con-
fronted with an emergency will turn to a bot-
tle of aspirin for protection. Use of a gun for
self defense could be dangerously compro-
mised if the gun is locked. Listen to Sammy
“The Bull” Gravano, the Mafia turncoat, quot-
ed in Vanity Fair: “Safety locks? You . . . pull the
trigger with a lock on, and I’ll pull the trigger
[without one]. We’ll see who wins.”33
Actually, if Cuomo was concerned about
unsafe public housing, he should have sued
his own agency.3 4 HUD is responsible for
housing authorities—including their loca-
tion, selection of tenants, eviction policies,
even inadequate policing. But rather than
admit to the abject failure of public housing,
Cuomo instructed his minions to plan law-
suits, modeled after those filed by cities and
counties from coast to coast. Here are the
two principal legal theories.
City Claims
Negligent Marketing. The city of Chicago,
and other cities following its example,
accused gun makers of “negligent market-
ing”—flooding the suburbs, where gun laws
are relaxed, with more guns than suburban
residents will buy, knowing that the excess
will find its way to the inner city, where gun
laws are more restrictive. 
Simple economic logic puts the lie to
Chicago’s negligent-marketing claim. If gun
makers reduce the supply of firearms sold to
suburban dealers, the market price of guns
will rise. Consumers with the most “elastic”
demand—that is, consumers who are most
sensitive to price changes—will reduce or
eliminate their purchases. The evidence is
clear: Those price-sensitive consumers are
typically law-abiding citizens. By contrast,
criminals’ demand for guns is highly “inelas-
tic.” They operate in a “survival at any price”
environment—which is why crooks are will-
ing to pay inflated black-market prices for
firearms. Perversely, by restricting the legal
supply of guns and raising the price, manu-
facturers will put relatively more weapons in
criminals’ hands and relatively fewer in the
hands of honest citizens.
Besides, any coordinated industry response
to a negligent-marketing claim would surely
run afoul of the antitrust laws. Manufacturers
that supposedly overproduce would have to
collude in order to reduce production jointly.
Yes, Smith & Wesson knows how many of its












the hands of hon-
est citizens.
guns, by themselves, don’t come close to satu-
rating the Maryland market. And Smith &
Wesson has no idea how many guns are
shipped to Maryland by Colt, Beretta, Glock,
Ruger, or any other manufacturer. Because
brands are more or less interchangeable, no
single gun maker would agree to cut back pro-
duction for fear that other manufacturers
would simply take up the slack. An antitrust
suit is sure to follow.
Compare the gun model with dram shop
laws, which hold bartenders liable when they
continue to ply an obviously drunk patron
with liquor knowing full well that the cus-
tomer could kill himself or others when he
drives home. Whatever the merit of those laws,
the analogy in the gun context is not to hold
the bartender responsible or even the bar
owner. Instead, it’s the equivalent of holding
Seagrams or Anheuser Busch accountable for
the ensuing drunk-driving fatality.
An obvious solution to Chicago’s prob-
lem, said the judge who dismissed the city’s
case this past September,3 5 would be for the
police to enforce laws that already prohibit
sales to minors, felons, the mentally incom-
petent, and anyone else without a state-
issued firearm owner’s ID card. Instead,
Chicago sued gun makers—who lawfully sell
to wholesalers who, in turn, sell to licensed
retailers. The city wants to hold gun makers
liable for the violent acts of criminals, most
of whom did not buy from licensed retailers
and over whom the manufacturers have no
control. As the Seventh Circuit held in a 1989
case, Bloomington v. Westinghouse,3 6a manufac-
turer is not liable for creation of a nuisance
by the buyer unless the manufacturer partic-
ipated in the conduct.
The chain of causation is broken when a
criminal act intervenes between a gun
maker’s original sale and an injury arising
out of the gun’s violent use. That time-honored
principle of law, by itself, is sufficient to dis-
miss these cases. A gun maker is liable only if
the risk of injury was foreseeable. And when
the law says “foreseeable,” it doesn’t mean
merely possible; it means that the interven-
ing criminal act was the natural and probable
outcome of the gun maker’s sale.37 Yes,
Americans own roughly 250 million guns
and commit about 500,000 gun-related
crimes each year.3 8But even if a different gun
is used in each of those crimes, only two-
tenths of 1 percent of all guns are involved in
criminal activity in any given year. That neg-
ligible chance of criminal conduct surely
doesn’t cross the “natural and probable out-
come” threshold.
The manufacture, sale, and ownership of
handguns are highly regulated. If a gun dealer
knowingly condones so-called straw purchas-
es—those made by legal buyers on behalf of
criminals—the dealer can be prosecuted under
current law. As of April 2000, 17 months after
Chicago filed its lawsuit, only four of the
retailers targeted by the city’s undercover
“stings” had been charged. In the one case to
go to trial, the jury took but 10 minutes to
find the defendant not guilty.39 If the behavior
of those dealers was as egregious as the city’s
complaint suggests, why were there only four
indictments and no convictions?
More generally, as gun control authorities
David Kopel and Richard Gardiner point out:
Handguns are the only consumer
product which an American con-
sumer is forbidden to purchase out-
side his state of residence. They are
the only mass consumer product for
which retailers, wholesalers, and
manufacturers all require federal
licenses. They are among a tiny
handful of consumer products for
which the federal government regu-
lates simple possession, and further
regulates the terms of retail transac-
tions, going so far as to require (for
handguns) that police be notified
and given an opportunity to disap-
prove the sale before being allowed
to consummate the transaction.4 0
Nationwide thousands of laws regulate
everything from who can own a gun and how
it can be purchased to where one can possess
or use it.4 1 Yet, in 1998, thousands of guns
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were brought illegally onto school grounds,
but there were only eight federal prosecu-
tions.4 2 From 1992 to 1999, according to a
Syracuse University study, federal gun prose-
cutions declined by 43 percent.4 3During the
two years ended mid-1999, half of the guns
used in crimes were traced by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to 389 deal-
ers, but only 19 had their licenses revoked.44
Julius Wachtel, retired after 23 years as an
ATF agent, remarked that he and his cowork-
ers had a saying: “No cases, no waves; little
cases, little waves; big cases, big waves.”4 5
An ATF study released in June 2000 docu-
mented 1,700 federal and state gun-law pros-
ecutions and 1,000 verdicts from July 1996
through December 1998.4 6 On a per year
basis, that’s 680 prosecutions and 400 guilty
pleas—trivial numbers when contrasted with
roughly 500,000 gun crimes committed in
the United States each year.
The effect of more rigorous law enforce-
ment and stiffer penalties is apparent from
the experience of Richmond, Virginia, with
Project Exile—a federal program that, in part,
mandates a five-year minimum sentence in
federal prison for any felon caught carrying
or trying to buy a gun. Richmond reported a
36 percent decline in gun homicides and 37
percent drop in armed robberies for the 1997
calendar year.4 7 When the National Rifle
Association sought to expand Project Exile, it
received little support from the Clinton
administration until September 1999, at
which time the president requested an incon-
sequential budget increase of $5 million.
Congressional Republicans had wanted $25
million, albeit targeted at cities in states
where the senators on the Appropriations
Committee served, not at cities where crime
rates were highest.4 8
To be sure, the states, not the federal gov-
ernment, exercise general police power. Why
should federal courts be turned into what one
federal judge in Richmond characterized as
“police courts”?49 Far better for the states to
stiffen their own penalties than to federalize
yet more crimes. Indeed, the federalization of
most gun crimes cannot be squared with the
Tenth Amendment. Still, many federal crimi-
nal laws would qualify as a legitimate exercise
of state police power. In any event, lack of
enforcement, whether state or federal, cannot
be laid at the doorstep of gun makers.
To listen to the politicians, if existing laws
are not being enforced, the best bet is to pass
more laws. In the Chicago suburbs, the leg-
islative unit is Cook County, which could
have enacted more restrictive gun laws. For
whatever reasons, it chose not to. Instead,
Cook County signed on as coplaintiff in
Chicago’s lawsuit. It wanted the judicial
branch to do what the county elected not to
do. Think about it: Cook County’s complaint
to the court, quite literally, is that the county
has itself failed to pass appropriate legisla-
tion. In effect, Cook County’s plea is “Stop
me before I don’t legislate again,” which
must be a first in American jurisprudence.5 0
Defective Product. The second major claim
of cities suing the gun industry is that
firearms are “defective and unreasonably
dangerous” as they are currently manufac-
tured. How are the firearms defective? Do
they misfire? Do they fire inaccurately? Not
at all. Even the Washington Post has editorial-
ized: “As a legal matter, it is hard to see how
companies making lawful products can be
held liable when those products perform pre-
cisely as intended.”5 1 No matter. First New
Orleans, then other cities, insisted that guns
are defective if they are sold without devices
that prevent discharge by unauthorized
users. On that ground, the cities hope to drag
gun makers to the settlement table—turning
the law of product liability on its head.
In order to hold gun makers liable for sell-
ing an unsafe product, tort law requires a
true defect, not merely that a product is dan-
gerous when it does what it is designed to do.
True enough, some guns have features that
are particularly attractive to criminals. But
that may be because criminals value many of
the same features that appeal to law enforce-
ment officers. Legislatures across the nation
have regulated virtually every aspect of gun
design and distribution. If a determination is
to be made that guns are unreasonably dan-
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gerous, the legislature, constrained by the
Constitution, must make that determina-
tion, not the courts. Here’s how a federal
judge in Massachusetts put it in a 1996 case,
Wasylow v. Glock: “Frustration at the failure of
legislatures to enact laws sufficient to curb
handgun injuries is not adequate reason to
engage the judicial forum in efforts to imple-
ment a broad policy change.”5 2
Even Brooklyn’s Jack Weinstein, the
favorite federal judge of the plaintiffs’ bar, had
this comment about the safety of guns:
“Whether or not . . . products liability law
would require an anti-theft safety mechanism
as part of the design of handguns requires a
balancing of the risk and utility. . . . Plaintiffs
have not shown that such a device is available,
nor have they asserted the possibility of show-
ing at trial that such a device would satisfy the
. . . risk-utility test.” Weinstein added, “The
mere act of manufacturing and selling a hand-
gun does not give rise to liability absent a
defect in the manufacture or design of the
product itself.”53
When it comes to guns, New Orleans city
officials are singularly unsuited to be the
guardians of public safety. In 1998 the city’s
police department traded more than 8,000
confiscated weapons—40 percent of which
were semiautomatic—to a commercial dealer
in return for Glocks. Nearly half of the trad-
ed guns would have been characterized as
“unsafe” in the city’s lawsuit against gun
makers—including TEC9s, AK47s, and Uzis,
banned since 1994. Only a quarter of the
guns had safety locks. Still, Mayor Marc
Morial signed and approved the deal, paving
the way for resale of those guns across the
nation.54 Ironically, New Orleans could end
up as defendant in other cities’ suits.
Under pressure, Morial suspended the
swap program.5 5But New Orleans wasn’t the
only hypocritical plaintiff. Police depart-
ments in Boston, Detroit, Oakland, Miami,
St. Louis, and Bridgeport also traded in
“unsafe” guns, which are now back on the
street, even while suing gun makers for mar-
keting a defective product.5 6 Undoubtedly
sensitive to the bad publicity, several police
departments announced that they would
explore a lease program, rather than trade-
ins, with Glock.5 7 Yes, that might relieve the
city of direct responsibility for providing
unsafe guns for commercial resale. But the
revised contractual arrangement is mere
camouflage for what is basically the same
deal—that is, a so-called defective product is
first used by the police and then recycled by
Glock for sales to private citizens. 
Whether the claim is a defective product,
negligent marketing, or public nuisance,
these lawsuits are rubbish. Five of them have
reached final judgment and all five were fully
or partially dismissed.5 8 In October 1999 an
Ohio state judge threw out Cincinnati’s
claims. He wrote that gun makers are not
responsible for the criminal misconduct of
customers. “The city’s complaint is an
improper attempt to have this court substi-
tute its judgment for that of the legislature.”59
The “design, manufacturer and distribution
of a lawful product” is not a public nui-
sance.60
Bridgeport’s and Miami’s suits were also
dismissed, in December 1999. Miami’s judge
observed that the city cannot use the courts
to regulate; that’s the job of the legislature.61
A Florida appeals court upheld the Miami
ruling, calling the lawsuit “an attempt to reg-
ulate firearms . . . through the . . . judiciary.”
“Clearly this round-about attempt is being
made because of the County’s frustration at
its inability to regulate firearms,” the appeals
court wrote. “The County’s frustration can-
not be alleviated through litigation.”6 2
In Chicago on September 15, 2000, a
judge threw out that city’s negligent-market-
ing claim saying that statistical evidence of
causation wasn’t good enough and that indi-
vidual instances of illegal sales were a matter
for the police to counter.6 3 Most recently, on
December 21, 2000, a federal judge dismissed
Philadelphia’s claims, describing the city’s
charge of public nuisance as “a theory in
search of a case,” and rejecting the negligence
claim “for lack of proximate cause.”6 4
Nevertheless, the trial lawyers press for-
ward. Sooner or later they’re likely to find a
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sympathetic judge who’s willing to ignore the
law in favor of his personal policy preferences.
It’s called “forum shopping,” and it’s a favorite
tactic of the plaintiffs’ bar. In fact, the major
reason each city has sued its local dealers as
well as the gun manufacturers is so the plain-
tiff and at least one defendant reside in the
same jurisdiction. That way the case cannot be
removed to federal court, where the rule of law
generally prevails over provincial prejudices.
While the search for friendly forums
moves ahead, pending lawsuits are having
predictable effects. Smaller gun makers are
going out of business; two California dealers
have declared bankruptcy; and Colt
announced a layoff of 300 workers, then said
it would withdraw from the consumer hand-
gun business and focus instead on military
weapons and collectibles.6 5Prospective litiga-
tion costs are showing up in higher gun
prices. Top quality handguns are now priced
in the $350 to $550 range, and fewer guns are
available for less than $100.66 Not surprising-
ly, higher prices have less impact on criminal
demand than on the demand from price-sen-
sitive, law-abiding citizens, especially those
from the inner city. 
On a parallel track, threatened litigation
by the federal government and actual litiga-
tion by dozens of cities were used as a blud-
geon to force the industry’s largest manufac-
turer, Smith & Wesson, into a settlement.
Despite countervailing pressure from its cus-
tomers and other gun makers, Smith &
Wesson threw in the towel—explaining that
the $100 million or more in damages sought
by several of the larger cities exceeded the
company’s profits for the entire past decade.
Moreover, the company protested, it cost $1
million to defend against each government-
sponsored claim.67 Smith & Wesson simply
didn’t have the resources to fight multiple
lawsuits across the country. Accordingly, on
March 17, 2000, it surrendered.
Smith & Wesson Settlement
Essentially, the Smith & Wesson deal is no
better than a shakedown. Various govern-
ment entities—HUD at the federal level, New
York and Connecticut at the state level, and
13 cities—agreed not to pursue their baseless
but costly litigation against the company.
Other cities and counties offered to review
their suits but made no formal commitment
to exclude Smith & Wesson.6 8 In return, the
gun maker pledged, first, to impose the fol-
lowing restrictions on its dealers and distrib-
utors: (a) No sales of any manufacturer’s
guns unless the buyer has passed a safety
course and cleared a background check—
even if the check takes longer than the three-
day period required by law. (b) No sales at any
gun show unless all sales at the show are sub-
ject to a background check.69 (c) No sales of
Smith & Wesson guns if a “disproportionate
number of crimes” is traced to guns sold by a
dealer or distributor.70 (d) No purchase by
one person of more than one gun at a time
unless the buyer is willing to wait 14 days
before picking up the rest.7 1
Second, Smith & Wesson agreed to child-
proof all of its handguns within a year, pre-
sumably by using features like a heavier trigger
pull or a magazine disconnect, which prevents
a gun from firing once the magazine is
removed. Under terms of the settlement, every
Smith & Wesson handgun would also be
equipped with an external lock within 60 days
and an internal lock within 24 months.72
Third, each gun would have a hidden seri-
al number to facilitate tracing the weapon if
it is used in a crime.7 3Fourth (reminiscent of
the tobacco settlement that forced manufac-
turers to fund anti-smoking programs),
Smith & Wesson promised to “work together
to support legislative efforts to reduce
firearm misuse” and contribute 1 percent of
its revenue toward an “education trust fund”
to inform the public about the risk of
firearms.7 4 The specific content of the anti-
gun campaign will be determined by a five-
member oversight committee in each settling
city. That same committee—comprising one
Smith & Wesson official and one representa-
tive each from the city, county, state, and fed-
eral government—will monitor and supervise
all provisions of the settlement.75
Those terms and conditions obscure what
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is actually driving the settlement. From the
government’s perspective, the settlement was
a means of bypassing state and federal legis-
latures that had been singularly unrespon-
sive to a variety of gun control proposals.
Moreover, the settlement circumvents court
review in many jurisdictions. Judicial
approval would be required only in jurisdic-
tions where lawsuits had already been filed
and were to be dismissed as a condition of
the settlement. That excludes the suits
threatened but not filed by HUD and various
cities and states.
From the company’s perspective, the set-
tlement represented an opportunity to avoid
the cost, time, and uncertainty of pending lit-
igation. That opportunity took on special
meaning in the case of Smith & Wesson,
which is owned by a United Kingdom com-
pany that was looking to sell its investment.76
The market for acquisitions is materially
diminished, of course, when lawsuits lurk
menacingly in the background.
To sweeten the deal further, President
Clinton sought to form an alliance of local
governments and HUD—the Communities
for Safer Guns Coalition—which would
refrain from buying police firearms manu-
factured by any company that didn’t sign the
settlement. That commitment to favor
Smith & Wesson was not embedded in the
text of the settlement agreement but com-
municated informally by Clinton.7 7 Perhaps
that’s because he knew that a refusal to deal
might violate local and federal procurement
regulations, discriminate against law-abiding
gun makers, and deny disfavored companies
the right to pursue a legitimate business.
In June 2000 the House of Representatives
attempted, unsuccessfully, to pass a bill pro-
hibiting enforcement of the Smith & Wesson
settlement. But the House did approve a provi-
sion that would prevent spending in support of
Clinton’s coalition, which ultimately com-
prised 600 localities that agreed, first, not to sue
Smith & Wesson and, second, to favor the com-
pany in police gun buys.7 8That was followed a
month later by Senate approval of a bill barring
federal procurement preferences for Smith &
Wesson.79 With a change in administration, the
settlement probably will not attract other gun
makers as co-signers, nor is the settlement like-
ly to benefit Smith & Wesson, which
announced this past June that it was closing
two of its plants for a month, in part because
angry customers were buying fewer guns.8 0
As the real terms of the settlement (including
preferential contracting) became clear, seven
gun makers and their trade association, the
National Shooting Sports Foundation, filed
suit against HUD secretary Cuomo, New York
attorney general Eliot Spitzer, Connecticut
attorney general Richard Blumenthal, and 14
mayors for conspiring to violate the constitu-
tional right of the gun makers to engage in
trade. The plaintiffs asked a federal court to for-
bid new gun regulations that were not autho-
rized by Congress.8 1By August 2000, however, it
was apparent that the buying preferences had
not materialized. Police departments wanted
the best weapons available for obvious reasons.
Even HUD bought guns from Glock,82 which
did not sign the settlement yet continued to
supply roughly two-thirds of police weapons
nationally.83 In January of this year, NSSF and
the seven gun makers dropped their suit.8 4
On another front, to intensify the pressure
for a settlement, Cuomo, Spitzer, and
Blumenthal threatened an antitrust suit
against Smith & Wesson’s rivals for organizing
a boycott against that company’s products.
Blumenthal issued subpoenas for documents,
despite no “solid evidence” other than a post-
settlement industry meeting attended by a
number of gun makers, who expressed criti-
cism of Smith & Wesson and the settlement.85
Spitzer pulled no punches. The goal, he gloat-
ed, is to “squeeze [gun] manufacturers like a
pincers”8 6—proving once again that unprinci-
pled politicians are more than willing to use
the antitrust laws as a club to force conformi-
ty by companies that refuse to play ball.
Guns, Crime, and Accidents
Paradoxically, politicians who are busily













put gun makers out of business overlook
compelling statistics suggesting that the
anti-gun crusade, if successful, would leave
Americans more, not less, susceptible to gun
violence. Three thousand criminals are law-
fully killed each year by armed civilians. By
comparison, fewer than 1,000 criminals are
killed annually by police.87 Guns are used
defensively—often merely brandished, not
fired—more than 2 million times per year.88
That’s far more than the 483,000 gun-related
crimes reported to police in 1996.89
Our country’s most permissive “gun-carry
laws” are in Vermont, which has a very low
crime rate.9 0Nationwide, as Yale scholar John
Lott has demonstrated, the larger the num-
ber of “carry permits” in a state, the larger the
drop in violent crime.91 Half of our popula-
tion lives in 31 states that have “shall issue”
laws, which mandate that a permit be grant-
ed to anyone above the age of 21 who is men-
tally competent, has no criminal record, pays
the requisite fee, and passes a gun safety
course. Those states haven’t turned into
Dodge City, writes columnist Jonathan
Rauch, “with fender-benders becoming hail-
storms of lead.”92
Actually, data show that Dodge City was
safer than today’s Washington, D.C.,9 3which
has the highest gun murder rate in the
United States, accompanied by the strictest
gun control. Is that because guns are readily
available in nearby Virginia? Then why is the
D.C. murder rate 57 per 100,000 while
Arlington, Virginia, an urban community
just across the river, has a rate of 1.6 per
100,000?9 4The answer is that social patholo-
gies in D.C. promote crime, whereas guns in
Virginia deter crime.
The reality is that less than 5 percent of
the population take out concealed handgun
permits.9 5 The rest of us benefit because the
criminals don’t know which 5 percent are
armed. Laws permitting the carrying of con-
cealed handguns reduce murder by about 8
percent and rape by about 5 percent.9 6Police
carry guns; mayors and bodyguards carry
guns; why not law-abiding residents of high-
crime areas?
In May 2000 the House of Representatives
passed (by voice vote with almost no debate)
a bill permitting federal judges (including
bankruptcy judges and even some retired
judges) to carry concealed guns in any state,
despite state laws to the contrary. A Florida
federal district judge, Harvey Schlesinger,
had this to say: “If a judge is in danger, the
fact that he or she is in one state or the other
does not eliminate the danger.”9 7 He might
have made the same statement about any
person at risk.
It’s a myth that the high gun ownership
rate is a cause of the high murder rate in the
United States. In Australia, for example, the
population was disarmed in 1998. Since
then, homicides are up 3.2 percent, assaults
up 8.6 percent, and armed robberies up 44
percent. In the preceding 25 years, armed
robberies and homicides committed with
firearms had declined.9 8 The Swiss, Finns,
and New Zealanders each have an ownership
rate similar to ours, but we have a far higher
murder rate.99 In Israel, gun ownership is 40
percent above the U.S. rate, but the murder
rate is far lower.100 When all countries are
studied, there is no correlation between gun
ownership and murder rates.
Interestingly, in Israel armed teachers are
common1 0 1and the threat of terrorism is per-
vasive, yet there are few terrorist attacks at
schools. That’s because armed civilians deter
crime. An armed gun store employee in Santa
Clara, California, shot a customer who had
threatened to kill three others. Armed citi-
zens prevented massacres in Anniston,
Alabama; Pearl, Mississippi; and Edinboro,
Pennsylvania.102 Yet the response of some
politicians to such incidents is to disarm
those very same citizens. Meanwhile, mad-
men in Rwanda murdered almost a million
people in less than four months using noth-
ing but machetes.1 0 3
Advocates of gun control reject that analy-
sis and point instead to a study by Arthur
Kellerman, who concluded that families pos-
sessing a gun are 22 times more likely to kill
a family member or acquaintance than to kill









into the Kellerman equation is that guns are
rarely fired; the value of the gun is to deter,
not to kill. Moreover, 85 percent of the
deaths that Kellerman cites are suicides.105
He explains that suicides are five times more
likely if there is a gun in the home.1 0 6But that
assumes a particular causal relationship. It is
just as likely that suicidal people acquire a
gun precisely because they intend, or may be
psychologically prone, to commit suicide.
Again conflating cause and effect,
Kellerman notes that a handgun in the home
raises the risk of death by 3.4 times.1 0 7Yet he
overlooks the strong possibility that people
at risk buy guns; the risk motivates the pur-
chase, not vice versa. By analogy, a storeown-
er might decide to put iron bars on his store
windows if the store were located in a high
crime area. Surely, no one would suggest that
the store would be safer if it removed the
bars. Nor would a family in a high-risk inner-
city environment be safer if it got rid of its
handgun. The gun, like the bars, serves to
safeguard lives and property. 
Remember that each individual could well
be the sole means of his own defense. In the
words of Kopel and Gardiner:
Governments are immune from suit
for failure—even grossly negligent or
deliberate failure—to protect citizens
from crime. Similarly, governments
are immune from suit for injuries
inflicted by criminals who were given
early release on parole. Accordingly,
it would be highly inappropriate for
the government, through the courts,
to make it . . . impossible for persons
to own handguns for self-defense
because, supposedly, ordinary
Americans are too stupid and clum-
sy to use them effectively. If the
Judiciary will not question the gov-
ernment’s civil immunity for failure
to protect people, the courts certain-
ly should not let themselves become
a vehicle that deprives people of the
tools they need to protect them-
selves.1 0 8
Ask yourself whether you’d be willing to put
a sign on your house stating, “This home is a
gun-free zone”109—especially if you lived in
the inner city.
While we’re on the topic of the inner city,
the head of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, Kweisi
Mfume, acknowledges that there are
“pathologies in any society that contribute to
violence”110—for example, teenage pregnancy,
dysfunctional schools, drug and alcohol
abuse, and a welfare system that subsidizes
illegitimacy and unemployment. And Cottrol
reminds us that in the late 19th and early
20th century state gun control laws were
aimed specifically at keeping guns away from
former slaves, other blacks, and recent immi-
grants.1 1 1 Cottrol, a self-described Hubert
Humphrey Democrat, also writes that “bans
on firearms ownership in public housing, the
constant effort to ban pistols poor people
can afford—scornfully labeled ‘Saturday
Night Specials’ and more recently ‘junk
guns’—are denying the means of self-defense
to entire communities in a failed attempt to
disarm criminal predators.”112
Or listen to Gregory Kane, an African-
American columnist for the Baltimore Sun:
“The NAACP should be assuring that every
law-abiding citizen in America’s black com-
munities has a safe, affordable handgun. . . .
These young men are smart enough to know
that the combined forces of city and state
governments, Bill Clinton, the police, the
NAACP, and the outrage of gun controllers
won’t protect them.”113 Civil rights activist
Charles Evers was even more blunt: “I put my
trust in God and my .45 . . . and not always in
that order.”114
One would have thought that, before filing
its lawsuit, the NAACP would have examined
the historical record. In 1967, a 13-year-old
could buy a rifle from most hardware stores or
even through the mail. Very few states had
retail age restrictions for handguns. Until
1969, most New York City high schools had a
shooting club; students regularly competed in
shooting contests; and the federal government

















state gun laws today are far more restrictive
than they were three decades ago. Yet, until the
1990s, more laws went hand in hand with an
explosion of violent crime.
When gun ownership rates were constant
through the 1960s and 1970s, violent crime
skyrocketed. With ownership rates growing
during the 1990s, we have seen dramatic
reductions in crime.116 Recent statistics from
the U.S. Bureau of Justice show that gun
deaths and woundings declined by 33 percent
from 1993 through 1997, with the decline
continuing in 1998. Over the same interval,
the number of guns in the United States grew
by 10 percent.117 In short, despite misleading
reports from the media, there is no evidence to
suggest that gun ownership and violent crime
are directly linked.
Speaking of the media, is it likely that the
press would have been so interested in
Buford Furrow—the neo-Nazi who killed a
mailman and wounded five others at a Los
Angeles Jewish community center—if he
weren’t a poster boy for gun control?  Jeff
Jacoby, columnist for the Boston Globe, offers
this answer: On May 3, 1999, Steven Abrams
decided to “execute” children on a play-
ground in Costa Mesa, California. He floored
his 1967 Cadillac, plowed through a chain
link fence into the crowd of children, killing
two and injuring five others—a toll more gris-
ly than Furrow’s. The Associated Press ran a
story two days later; six papers ran a follow-
up four days afterward. That was it—no
drumbeat of national news, no editorials or
op-eds, and, of course, no gun.118 Less than
one year later, gun hysteria seemed to have
gripped the nation: From the Washington Post
in April 2000 we read, “Four 6-year-old boys
were suspended from school for pointing fin-
gers at one another as mock guns in a game
of ‘cops and robbers’ on the playground.”119
For the five years ending in 1997, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
reported a 21 percent decrease in violent
crime, a 21 percent decrease in gun-related
deaths, and a 41 percent decrease in nonfatal
gun injuries.120 Gun deaths and overall homi-
cides reached their lowest level in more than
30 years.1 2 1Some experts credit tougher gun
control and safety courses, but that doesn’t
explain why all violent crime decreased by the
same percentage as gun-related crime. The
more likely reasons for the parallel decline
are more vigorous enforcement, a booming
economy, the waning crack trade, and an
aging population.
CDC also reports that violent behavior by
adolescents is declining sharply, despite
Columbine and other high-profile school
incidents. That’s confirmed by data from the
U.S. Department of Education indicating
that expulsions for bringing firearms to
school during the academic year 1997–98
were lower by a third than during the prior
year.122 And it’s not only teen violence but
also teen accident rates that are plummeting.
The National Center for Health Statistics
reports that in 1997 fatal gun accidents
involving children were at an all-time low,
down 75 percent since 1975. Of more than
32,000 gun-related deaths, only 630 were of
children under 15. Of those, 142 were acci-
dental.123 Predictably, that good news was
met by an outcry from the Washington Post
that safety locks will “reduce this country’s
horrifying accidental-gun-death rate of chil-
dren under 15.”124
Horrifying? More children under 15 are
killed by bikes, swimming pools, and ciga-
rette lighters than by gun accidents.1 2 5 Will
our mayors be pursuing each of those indus-
tries? If gun manufacturers are responsible
for violence, why not the makers of the steel
used in the guns? Indeed, when an Ohio
appellate judge upheld the dismissal of
Cincinnati’s gun suit in August 2000, he
wrote: “Were we to decide otherwise, we
would open a Pandora’s box. The city could
sue the manufacturers of matches for arson,
or automobile manufacturers for traffic acci-
dents, or breweries for drunken driving.”126
If anything, the case for holding car makers
liable for drunk-driving accidents is stronger
than the case for charging gun makers for
gun-related injuries. “In contrast to gun deal-
ers, automobile [manufacturers] make no













criminal. Nor do automobile manufacturers
require that their dealers take even minimal
steps to check if a prospective automobile pur-
chaser has recent convictions for drunk or
reckless driving, or even for vehicular homi-
cide.”127 Moreover, “automobile manufactur-
ers have much more ability than gun manu-
facturers to control dealer behavior, since
most automobile manufacturers have exclu-
sive, direct relationships with dealers. In con-
trast, the majority of gun dealers purchase
inventory from wholesalers” without any reli-
able means of tracking retail purchases.128
Before we compromise the Constitution—
undermining the principles of federalism
and separation of powers, violating rights
recognized expressly in the Second
Amendment and implicitly in the Ninth—we
ought to be sure of three things: first, that
we’ve identified the real problem; second,
that we’ve pinpointed its cause; and, third,
that our fix is less intrusive than alternative
fixes. The spreading litigation against gun
makers fails all three tests. Guns do not
increase violence; they reduce violence.
Banning or regulating firearms will not elim-
inate the underlying social pathologies that
cause violence. And a less intrusive remedy
already exists: enforce existing laws.
There is a lesson to be learned from all of
this. If we do nothing to rein in baseless, gov-
ernment-sponsored lawsuits, private attor-
neys and their accomplices in the public sec-
tor will continue to invent legal theories to
exact tribute from friendless industries. In
the latest rounds of litigation, law-abiding
gun manufacturers may be forced to pay for
the actions of criminals. That outcome will
likely entice politicians unwilling to make
tough choices and enrich trial lawyers, but
there can be no pretense that litigation of
that sort has any basis at all in the rule of law.
Clinton Administration
Proposals
Apparently, that logic wholly escaped the
Clinton administration. About to be
drowned in litigation from cities, counties,
and more than 3,000 housing authorities,
the gun industry was finding it hard to
attract private investors to fund research on
“smart guns”—personalized weapons incor-
porating technology that permits firing only
by authorized parties. Not to worry, said
President Clinton in his January 2000 State
of the Union address. He and Sen. Ted
Kennedy (D-Mass) favored a $10 million
research subsidy to Smith & Wesson to devel-
op a smart weapon,129 which could then no
doubt be sold to presently unarmed subur-
ban moms. Kristen Rand, from the anti-gun
Violence Policy Center said, “It makes the
lawsuits seem like a charade.”130 Gun control
and corporate welfare do indeed make
strange bedfellows.
The depth of the hypocrisy in Washington
during the Clinton era was beyond belief.
The president called for draconian gun con-
trols after Columbine but told his
Hollywood supporters, “There’s no call for
finger-pointing here.” Although some young
people will be pushed over the edge by violent
imagery, that “doesn’t make anybody who
makes any movie or any video game or any
television program a bad person or personal-
ly responsible. . . . For most kids it won’t
make any difference.”1 3 1Clinton said he did-
n’t want to lecture the entertainment indus-
try—an ongoing source of major bucks.
Then, to satisfy critics, he recommended an
18-month study to see if the industry delib-
erately markets violence to kids. Carefully
timed so that no legislation would be possi-
ble until after the 2000 election, the study
was guaranteed not to embarrass either
Clinton himself or Al Gore’s fundraisers.1 3 2
Meanwhile, Clinton and his surrogates
offered a variety of gun control proposals.
After six kids were trapped in the crossfire
between rival gangs at the National Zoo in
Washington, D.C., Gore bemoaned the shoot-
ings, then announced to a shocked audience
of Democratic donors, “We really have to have
mandatory child safety locks.”1 3 3Laws against
murder and a ban on handguns in the

















but the former vice president supposed they
would somehow be foiled by safety locks.
Let’s look at that proposal along with a few
others, and see why none of them will work.
Safety Locks
Gun accidents are not a significant prob-
lem. Locks are cumbersome and slow in an
emergency. They’re already available on 90
percent of new guns sold.134 They give parents
a false sense of security. In recent tests, 30 of 32
models of safety locks were found to afford
inadequate protection. That generated calls
for government-imposed standards, notwith-
standing that not a single reported injury has
been traced to an ineffective lock.135
Smart Guns
Colt has estimated that 60 million people
who do not own guns would consider buying
smart guns.1 3 6At the same time, a smart gun
mandate for new guns would have no effect
on the 250 million guns already in circula-
tion. Smart guns may prevent some unau-
thorized use, but they can be programmed
for multiple users and will not, therefore,
deter straw purchases. Moreover, suicides
and homicides, not accidents, are the two
leading causes of gun death,137 and most sui-
cides and homicides are committed by the
gun owner. In 1997 only three-tenths of 1
percent of gun-related deaths were acciden-
tal. Many of those accidents involved owners
cleaning their guns; and many others were
preventable by existing technology like mag-
azine disconnects and heavier trigger pulls.138
One Gun per Month
Interestingly, from 1996 through 1998
Virginia was one of three states (the others
were Maryland and North Carolina) that lim-
ited buyers to one gun per month. But
Virginia was third in the nation as a source of
guns used by criminals in other states.139
Currently, multigun sales must be reported
to authorities for investigation. The “one
gun” rule makes sales more difficult to trace.
And the rule is easy for criminals to circum-
vent by using straw purchasers. Most impor-
tant, advocates of one gun per month have
produced no evidence to show that multiple
gun purchases are responsible for an increase
in illegal activity.
Age Limit
Under current federal law, 21 is the mini-
mum age to purchase a handgun; 18 is the
minimum age to possess a handgun. Clinton
proposed to ban possession by anyone under
age 21.140 That’s a bad idea, says John Lott.
“Laws allowing those between 18 and 21
years of age to carry a concealed handgun
reduce violent crimes just as well as those
limited to citizens over 21.”141 Yes, 18- and
19-year-olds commit gun crimes at the high-
est rates, but they are also likely victims, who
need protection from gang members.
Furthermore, we allow 18-year-olds to vote,
go to war, get married and divorced, and have
an abortion; surely they are sufficiently
mature to be able to defend themselves.
Gun Shows
If gun shows are a problem, it’s because
current laws have raised the cost of a legiti-
mate license. The number of licensed dealers
declined from 250,000 in 1993 to 83,000 six
years later.1 4 2 Harvard researcher David M.
Kennedy reports that sellers “at gun shows
are [often] people who have been forced to
give up their licenses.”1 4 3 Moreover, the
Clinton administration has provided no evi-
dence that such shows are an important
source of guns for criminals.144 In the mid-
1980s, a survey of felons in 12 state prisons
indicated that fewer than 1 percent got their
guns at gun shows. A 1997 Department of
Justice study came up with 2 percent.1 4 5And
those figures include straw purchases, which
are already illegal, and purchases through
licensed dealers, which are already subject to
background checks. According to an ATF
study, during the 30 months ending
December 1998, 26,000 guns used in crimes
were purchased at gun shows.1 4 6 That’s
10,400 guns per annum, which is only 2.1
percent of the guns used in the roughly
500,000 gun-related crimes each year.
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be foiled by safety
locks.
Background Checks
Checks are already required for all dealer
sales, including those at gun shows. Clinton
would have extended the requirement to non-
dealer sales at gun shows. That’s the rule
Maryland has already adopted. Not surpris-
ingly, Maryland now wants to go further and
ban gun shows on public property and prop-
erty that receives taxpayer support.1 4 7 The
National Rifle Association’s chief lobbyist,
James Jay Baker, observes, “Our opponents say
that all we want to do is close the loophole, but
they’re never satisfied.”148 Perhaps the slippery
slope argument isn’t illusory after all.
The NRA has agreed to background
checks at gun shows, provided the check
could be completed within 24 hours. But
proposed legislation in the Senate contained
a three-business-day time frame, presumably
because most gun shows occur over a week-
end. House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-
Tex.) asked, quite logically, why the FBI
couldn’t be open during weekend hours.1 4 9
In the House of Representatives, the cor-
responding bill included nearly all of the
items that the Democrats had demanded—a
requirement for safety locks, a prohibition
on youth possession of semiautomatic
weapons, a ban on large-capacity ammuni-
tion clips, and a lifetime ban on gun posses-
sion by anyone convicted of a felony as a juve-
nile. But the background check provision
incorporated the NRA’s proposal for a 24-
hour time limit. House Democrats killed the
bill150—apparently more interested in an elec-
tion issue than in real gun reform.
The National Instant Check System,
implemented under the 1994 Brady Act, now
has data on 38 million Americans. Expert
witnesses testified before Congress in June
2000 that system glitches have delayed or
blocked fully a quarter of all lawful purchas-
es.151 Who knows how many of those pur-
chases might have prevented gun violence.
John Lott reports that “the national waiting
period [under the Brady Act] had no signifi-
cant impact on murder or robbery rates and
was associated with a small increase in rape
and aggravated-assault rates.”152 Criminals
are not deterred; law-abiding citizens who
want to defend themselves are told to wait.
Researchers at Georgetown University
and Duke University identified 32 states that
adopted Brady-style restrictions when the act
was passed in 1994, and compared those
states with 19 others that already enforced
similar restrictions. Writing in the Journal of
the American Medical Association, the research-
ers reported that the decline in gun homicide
rates was the same for the two groups of
states, thus belying the contention that the
Brady Act reduced gun murders. There was
“no evidence that implementation of the
Brady Act was associated with a reduction in
homicide rates.”153 The only contrary statis-
tic was a larger drop in gun suicides for peo-
ple above age 55 in the 32-state group. The
authors explained, however, that there was an
offsetting increase in nongun suicides within
the 32-state group.1 5 4
Notwithstanding Clinton’s litany of gun
control proposals, none would have prevent-
ed any of the recent spate of gun-related vio-
lence. In Illinois and Indiana, Benjamin
Smith, a white supremacist, age 21, who went
on a shooting rampage, bought two guns
from an unlicensed dealer, but not at a gun
show. He had previously failed a background
check and was not prosecuted.1 5 5In Atlanta,
a commodities trader killed nine, but his pur-
chase of four handguns would not have vio-
lated any of the proposed new laws. Likewise
for Buford Furrow, who bought seven guns
legally before assaulting children at a Jewish
community center in Los Angeles.1 5 6 In
Conyers, Georgia, the gun was stolen from
the killer’s stepfather.1 5 7 In Michigan, a six-
year-old also stole a gun. He lived in a crack
house, without his mother or father, where
the loaded gun was easily accessible.158
More recently, in a Chicago suburb, a
deranged former employee killed five and
wounded four at a Navistar engine plant. He
was armed with an AK47, pump shotgun,
rifle, and revolver—purchased using a firearm
owners identification card issued by the state
two weeks before he was convicted of a sex










one demanded that he turn in the ID card.159
And this past March, in a suburban high
school near San Diego, a 15-year-old boy
killed 2 and wounded 13 using his father’s
handgun, which he had extracted from a
locked cabinet and brought to school in vio-
lation of California law. The troubled teen,
who dabbled in marijuana, acid, speed, and
alcohol, had announced his plan for mass
murder, but no one took him seriously.160
California’s gun laws—among the strictest in
the nation—didn’t help at all. Under those
laws, unsupervised juveniles can’t possess a
handgun or live ammunition, a background
check is required on all gun sales, new resi-
dents must register their guns, purchases are
final only after a 10-day waiting period, train-
ing is mandatory, and buyers are limited to
one gun per month.1 6 1
The highest profile incident occurred at
Columbine High School in Littleton,
Colorado. There, the killers’ girlfriend, age
18, bought two shotguns and a rifle. She
would have passed a background check. The
killers’ semiautomatic TEC9 was already ille-
gal, as were the pipe bombs and grenades
that they possessed. Both shooters were
reputed to have idolized Hitler; they wore
trench coats and metal-tip boots with swasti-
ka emblems, made bombs in their parents’
garage, and stored guns in their bed-
room.162 A degree of parental supervision
might have uncovered a serious psychologi-
cal problem before it became fatal.
The Columbine outcome might also have
been different if more guns had been pre-
sent—in the hands of security guards or per-
haps even teachers or an armed principal.
Maybe a dress code and stricter discipline
would have helped. But, observes Chief Judge
J. Harvie Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, “We are now in a society
which freely and instinctively litigates rou-
tine public school decisions in the federal
judiciary.”1 6 3In public schools, avoiding law-
suits takes precedence over discipline, and
effective education is too often sacrificed at
the altar of students’ rights.
President Clinton may well have had a
hidden agenda for dealing with future
Columbines: federal registration, the ulti-
mate in gun control short of prohibition.
Despite repeated denials by Vice President
Gore and others, Clinton asked rhetorically:
“Should people . . . have to register guns like
they register their cars? Do I think that?” He
then answered, “Of course I do.”164 Never
mind that registration would mean a nation-
al database containing names and addresses
of every law-abiding, peaceful gun owner.
Never mind that car registration—by states,
not the federal government—is primarily for
revenue. And never mind that some govern-
ment officials and private groups want to use
registration to attain their ultimate objective,
which is outright confiscation of handguns.
Indeed, Pete Shields, the founding chairman
of Handgun Control, acknowledged: “The
first problem is to slow down the number of
handguns being produced and sold. . . . The
second problem is to get handguns regis-
tered. The final problem is to make posses-
sion of all handguns . . . totally illegal.”165
The evidence—or more precisely the lack
of evidence—is compelling in those states
that already require registration. There are no
serious studies that link registration to a
reduction in gun-related violence. To the sur-
prise of no one except gun-control zealots,
criminals will not register their firearms.
Only law-abiding citizens will comply with
registration requirements.
Conclusion
Legislatures have a duty to secure the con-
stitutional legacy of Americans to defend
themselves—by frustrating ineffective gun
control proposals, preventing registration,
and blocking the more radical calls for gun
confiscation. Yet, even if the legislatures
behave responsibly, courts are the final bul-
wark in safeguarding our right to keep and
bear arms. Courts may not be used as a way
around the legislative process.
The American public, especially voters









tive, which is out-
right confiscation
of handguns. 
tem is rapidly becoming a tool for extortion
by a coterie of politicians and trial lawyers.
Sometimes they seek money; sometimes they
pursue policy goals; often they abuse their
power. Take it from former labor secretary
Robert Reich, certainly not renowned for his
opposition to imperious government. Reich
tells us that his former boss in the White
House, President Clinton, launched “law-
suits to succeed where legislation failed. The
strategy may work,” Reich adds, “but at the
cost of making our frail democracy even
weaker. . . . This is nothing short of faux leg-
islation, which sacrifices democracy to the
discretion of administration officials operat-
ing in utter secrecy.”1 6 6
Reich has it just about right. But the prob-
lem outlives the Clinton White House. It
infests many of the statehouses and city
halls. Like most infestations, this one can be
fumigated. When we condone the selective
and retroactive application of extraordinary
legal principles, intended specifically to
transfer resources from disfavored defen-
dants to favored plaintiffs—or even worse, to
the public sector—we substitute political
cronyism for fundamental fairness, profane
the rule of law, and debase personal freedom.
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